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COMMENT 
SANCTIONS IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT POWER 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
The most recent proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure1 present interesting questions from the perspective of 
Copyright .o 1983 by Stephen B. Burbank 
• Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968, 
J.D. 1973, Harvard University. This is a revised version of remarks delivered to the Civil 
Procedure Section at the 1983 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. 
l. A June 1981 preliminary draft of the proposed amendments was published for com­
ment. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
90 F.R.D. 451 ( 1981) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft]. Public hearings were held in 
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 16, 1981) and in Los Angeles (Nov. 6, 1981). See id. at 451,454. The 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules submitted its final draft of the proposed amendments 
(other than the proposed amendments to Rules 4 and 45, which were treated separately) to the 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure on March 9, 1982. Advisory Com­
mittee's Final Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Mar. 
9, 1982) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Final Draft]. After 
making changes, the Standing Committee recommended that the proposed amendments be 
approved by the Judicial Conference. See letter from Hon. Walter R. Mansfield to Joseph F. 
Spaniol (June 30, 1982) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review); letter from Hon. Edward 
T. Gignoux to Joseph F. Spaniol (July 14, 1982) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review); 
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 86 (Sept. 22-23, 
1982) [hereinafter cited as Proceedings]. The Conference approved the proposed amendments 
with minor changes at its September 1982 meeting and transmitted them to the Supreme 
Court. See id. 
On April 28, 1983, the Court adopted the proposed amendments, effective August l, 
1983, and authorized the Chief Justice to transmit them to Congress. 51 U.S.L. W. 450 l (U.S. 
May 3 , 1983). See AMENDMENTS TO THE RuLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT 
COURTS, H.R. Doc. No. 54, 98th Cong., lst Sess. 3-25 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SuPREME 
CouRT REPORT] . The proposed Rules as approved by the Judicial Conference, together with 
the Advisory Committee's Notes and forms are printed in id. at 35-84; see also 97 F.R.D. 165-
244 (1983). 
For the fate of the proposed amendment to Rule 4, see Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 
97-227, 96 Stat. 246 (delaying effective date); Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 
997 
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the jurisprudence of court rulemaking. That is a perspective which, 
except as to matters of rulemaking process and structure, has been 
largely neglected, 2 and it has not informed the discussion of the most 
controversial of the proposed amendments, those dealing with 
sanctions. 
The 1980 amendments, we well remember, were criticized in 
high places as a "compromise" and as "tinkering changes. "3 AI-
Stat. 2527 (enacting an amendment to Rule 4). See also Siegel, Practice Commentary on 
Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Ejf Feb. 26, 1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Pre­
cautions, 96 F.R.D. 88 (I 983). 
2. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of l934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1018-23, 
1193-97 ( 1982). For suggested changes in the court rulemaking process, see W. BROWN, FED­
ERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 41-63, 118-34 (1981). for proposals as to 
structural alternatives, see id. at 64-86, 108-17. In February, 1982, the House of Delegates of 
the American Bar Association approved principles to "promote openness in the rule-making 
process" that included publishing rulemaking procedures, publishing and distributing draft 
rules and major changes therein, holding public hearings on draft rules and major changes, 
maintaining publicly available minutes of proceedings, and taking action on final reports on 
proposed rules at open meetings. See SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELE­
GATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 9-10 (1982). The House of Delegates also ap­
proved changes in the relevant statutes and procedures so as to delegate rulemaking
. 
authority 
to the Judicial Conference and to make the Conference's Advisory Committees "broadly repre­
sentative of all segments of the legal profession .... "!d. at 9. The long-ago promised formal 
statement of rulemaking procedures from the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, see Burbank, supra, at 1021 n.l7, has yet to appear. The 
chairman of that committee, Judge Gignoux, has, however, testified at a hearing on the federal 
court rulemaking process held by the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad­
ministration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee on April 21, 1983. Copies of Judge 
Gignoux's statement and of the statements of James F. Holderman (on behalf of the ABA) 
and Alan B. Morrison (Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group) are on file with the Hofstra 
Law Review. 
One matter of court rulemaking jurisprudence that, in light of the proposed amendments, 
can no longer be neglected concerns the relationship between supervisory court rules and local 
court rules. The proposed amendments explicitly permit local rulemaking on some matters, see 
proposed fED. R. Ctv. P. 16(b), SuPREME CouRT REPORT, supra note I, at 5 (categories of 
cases may be exempted from scheduling order requirement); id. at 5-6 (magistrate may be 
authorized to enter (and modify) scheduling order), and the Advisory Committee Notes else­
where state that local experimentation is permitted. See prop:Jsed fED. R. Ctv. P. 16 advisory 
committee note, SuPREME CouRT REPORT, supra note I, at 52 (responsibility for drafting 
pretrial order). The rulemakers' criteria in making these judgments are not clear; nor are the 
implications of this greater specificity about local court rulemaking for other areas where it is 
lacking. How, for instance, can a local rule limiting the number of interrogatories be upheld 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976) (I pretermit fED. R. Ctv. P. 83, which in my view is invalid, 
see Burbank, supra, at 1193 n.763), given the Committee's 1980 decision to withdraw an 
amendment to fED. R. Ctv. P. 33(a) that would have blessed such rules, a decision supported 
by reference to "[t]he constantly-echoed criticism that a limitation on the number of 
questions was arbitrary, unreasonable and unnecessary"? H.R. Doc. No. 306, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 18 ( 1980). 
3. 446 U.S. 995, 998, 1000 (1980) (dissenting statement of Powell, J.). We may not 
remember that "tinkering" by state legislatures was one of the rallying cries in the campaign 
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though compromise also appears to have played a part in the pro­
posed amendments,4 their emphasis on sanctions represents no mere 
tinkering. To be sure, sanctions for a willful violation of Rule 1 1  and 
for various defaults in connection with discovery were part of the 
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Moreover, at least since 
Professor Rosenberg's influential 1958 article,6 sanctions have been 
an important item on the agenda of those concerned about discovery 
abuse. Sanctions received attention in the 1970 Amendments 7 and 
again in the 1980 Amendments.8 But, with these proposed amend­
ments, they have moved center-stage. The rulemakers propose: sanc­
tions for violation of the certification requirement imposed by pro­
posed Rule 1 1  for pleadings, motions and other papers,9 sanctions for 
for federal legislation authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure in civil 
actions at law, see Report of the Committee on Umform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B. A. J. 509, 
513 ( 1 920) ("[c]onstant unscientific legislation"), as well as in the national campaign for pro­
cedural reform, see_, e.g., Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: 
CENTENARY ESSAYS 55, 61-63 ( A. Reppy ed. 1949) ("Code Tinkering in New York"). More­
over, Dean Clark, the Reporter of the original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, adduced 
the spectre of congressional "tinkering" in arguing against an interpretation of the Rules Ena­
bling Act of 1 934 that would require the submission of amendments to Congress. See Bur­
bank, supra note 2, at 1 1 53 n.60 I. 
Now that the rulemaking process has been more closely assimilated to the legislative pro­
cess and may become even more closely assimilated, see s upra notes I & 2, and in light of the 
speed with which these proposed amendments follow the 1 980 amendments, is there reason to 
fear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will become a latter day Throop Code? On the 
Throop Code, see Clark, supra, at 62. 
4. Thus, the preliminary draft of proposed FED. R. Civ. P. l 6(b) required "the judge" 
to enter a scheduling order, Preliminary Draft, supra note I, at 466, and the Advisory Com­
mittee Note made clear that the choice of language was deliberate, reflecting the Committee's 
"judgment that it is preferable that this task should be handled by a district judge rather than 
a magistrate, except when the magistrate is acting under 28 U .S.C. § 636." /d. at 472. In 
response to objections by federal magistrates, the Advisory Committee changed the language 
in its final draft to permit entry of a scheduling order by a magistrate "only when specifically 
authorized by district court rule . . . .  " See, e.g., Comments of the National Association of 
United States Magistrates (Oct. 10, 1 981) (copy on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Final 
Draft, supra note l, at 9. The Standing Committee added language to enable a magistrate to 
modify a schedule "when specifically authorized by district court rule." See letter from Hon. 
Walter R. Mansfield to Joseph F. Spaniol, supra note I. The words "only" and "specifically" 
in proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) were deleted by the Judicial Conference. See Proceedings, 
supra note I, at 86; SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note I, at 42. See also id. at 5-6. 
5. See 308 U.S. 645, 676 ( 1 937) (Rule ll); id. at 704 (Rule 30(g));  id. at 7 1 0-13 (Rule 
37) see also id. at 736 (Rule 56(g)). 
6. Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pre/rial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 480 
( 1958). 
7. See 398 U.S. 977 (!970). 
8. See 446 U.S. 995 (!980). 
9. Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. II provides in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has 
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failure to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, for failure to appear 
at, to be prepared to participate in, or to participate in good faith in, 
a conference, under proposed Rule 16/0 and sanctions for violation 
of the certification requirement imposed by proposed Rule 26 for dis­
covery requests, responses ·and objections.11  
read the pleading, motion, o r  other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, infor· 
mation, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken 
unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the 
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person 
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, in­
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee. 
SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
1 0. Proposed FED. R. C!v. P. 16(f) provides: 
(f) SANCTIONS. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or 
pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or 
pretrial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unprepared to 
participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to participate in 
good faith, the judge, upon motion or his own initiative, may make such orders with 
regard thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall 
require the party or the attorney representing him or both to pay the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's 
fees, unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note I, at 8. 
1 1 . Proposed FED. R. C!v. P. 26(g) provides: 
(g) SIGNING OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS, RESPONSES, AND OBJEC­
TIONS. Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a 
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in 
his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented 
by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state his address. 
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that he has read the 
request, response, or objection, and that to the best of his knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (I) consistent with these rules and 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the 
case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. if a re.quest, response, or objection 
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the party making the request, response or objection ar.d a 
party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed. 
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I will not rehearse-although I will touch on some of-the pru­
dential arguments of those who favor and those who oppose en­
hanced emphasis on sanctions as a means to meet and deter per­
ceived abuses in the conduct of civil litigation. My concern, rather, 
has to do with questions of power. The analysis is offered with no 
pretensions to definitiveness. It may, however, stimulate further 
thought about questions that, it seems to me , have received inade­
quate attention in the past. 
In the Note to proposed Rule 11, the Advisory Committee, after 
observing that "in practice Rule 1 1  has not been effective in deter­
ring abuses " and that the courts have been reluctant to impose sanc­
tions, states: 
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by build­
ing upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court 
to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose op­
ponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation. See, 
e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Hall v. 
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).12 
In the Note to proposed Rule 26, the Committee states: 
Because of the asserted reluctance to impose sanctions on at­
torneys who abuse the discovery rules, ... Rule 26(g) makes ex­
plicit the authority judges now have to impose appropriate sanc­
tions and requires them to use it. This authority derives from Rule 
37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent power. See Road­
way ... i'v!artin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 661-62 (D. 
Col. 1980); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who 
Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 619 (1977).13 
In one Note, the Committee acknowledges that the proposed 
amendment represents an expansion of existing authority. In the 
other, it asserts that the proposed amendment merely codifies ex­
isting authority and requires the courts to exercise it. The apparent 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party 
on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
SuPREME COURT REPORT, supra note I, at 10-ll. 
12. Proposed FED. R. Ctv. P. II advisory committee note, SuPREME CouRT REPORT, 
supra note l, at 38. 
13. Proposed FED. R. Ctv. P. 26 advisory committee note, SuPREME CouRT REPORT, 
supra note l ,  at 60. 
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inconsistency suggests a need to examine the extent to which the 
Committee's proposed sanction provisions are, in fact, restatements 
of existing authority, and to the extent they are not, whether they 
pose any serious questions of power. 
I am uneasy whenever, as in the Advisory Committee Note to 
proposed Rule 26,  I encounter a defense of an assertion of power 
predicated on multiple sources of authority. My uneasiness is condi­
tioned generally in the context of supervisory court rulemaking by an 
awareness, based on historical research, that the Advisory Commit­
tee has not often been overly troubled by questions of power.1 4 In­
deed, the Reporter of the 1938 Civil Rules, then Dean Clark, once 
wrote an article, based on a memorandum he had prepared for the 
Advisory Committee, in which he traced the authority to deal with 
matters of procedure affecting appeals to a variety of sources.1 6 He 
later noted to a correspondent that Professor Moore had "always 
laughed slyly at [that] article on the basis that there I did much 
rewriting of the Act. I have answered that some one must do it and 
that I was affording a logical basis therefor."16 
Proposed Rule 26(g) requires every attorney or unrepresented 
party to sign every discovery request, response or objection and pro­
vides that the signature constitutes an elaborate certification calling 
for, among other things, an exercise of judgment about such matters 
as the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the 
amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation. The proposed Rule also provides that if a certification 
is made in violation of the Rule, the· court shall impose an appropri­
ate sanction that may include reasonable expenses incurred because 
of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.17 To what ex­
tent does this provision regarding sanctions "make explicit the au­
thority judges now have " ?  
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper/8 the Court considered three 
14. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1132-3 7, 1194. 
15. For the article, see Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to ;\fake Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1303 (1936). The memorandum, dated February 2, 1936, can 
be found in 2 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCE­
DURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Harvard Law School Library). See 
also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1138 n.545. 
16. Letter from Charles E. Clark to Edgar B. Tolman (Oct. 15, 1938) (extract with 
letter from Charles E. Clark to Monte M. Lemann (Nov. I, 1938) (Chailes E. Clark Papers, 
Yale University Library, box 113, folder 65)). 
17. See supra note II. 
18. 447 U. S. 752 (1980). 
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possible sources of authority for the district court's order that coun­
sel for the plaintiffs pay more than $17,000 in costs and attorney's 
fees to the defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 192719 was found not to authorize 
an award of attorney's fees. 20 The Court upheld the "inherent 
power " of a trial court to award attorney's fees in certain circum­
stances but defined those circumstances as necessarily including con­
duct that constitutes or is tantamount to bad faith, as to which there 
was no specific finding. 21 Finally, the Court invited the district court 
on remand to consider whether to award costs and attorney's fees for 
failure to answer Roadway Express' interrogatories under Rule 
37(b).22 
Now, since the Court's decision in Roadway Express, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927 has been amended to include the sanction of attorney's fees. 23 
The statutory amendment should not, however, provide comfort 
to-indeed, it should discomfort-the rulemakers. The proposed 
amendment to Rule 26 (as with proposed Rule 11) provides sanc­
tions that may include a reasonable attorney's fee without requiring 
conduct that was willful, in bad faith, or the like. 24 In amending 
section 1927, on the other hand, Congress specifically declined to 
alter the standard under existing law, described by Representative 
Mazzoli as requiring "the attorney conduct, if sanctionable, to be 
solely for the purpose of delay . . . .  "n As he explained: "The man­
agers on the part of the House were firm in their resolve to maintain 
the tough standard of current law so that the legislation in no way 
would dampen the legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing his 
client." 26 Representative McClory observed that the House conferees 
19. "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United 
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase 
costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally such 
excess costs."  28 U. S.C. § 1927 ( 1976). The statute has since been amended. See infra text 
accompanying note 23. 
20. 44·1 U. S. at 757·63. 
21. !d. at 764·67. 
22. !d. at 764. 
23. The current version reads: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the 
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such 
conduct. 
28 U.S.C. § 1927 ( Supp. Y 1982). 
24. See supra notes 9, II. 
25. 126 CONG. REC. H8047 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980). 
26. !d. 
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were unable to accept the Senate standard (which required a finding 
that the attorney "intentionally engage[d] in conduct unreasonably 
and primarily for the purpose of delaying or increasing the cost of 
the litigation ")27 because it "would have lowered the standard of dil­
atory conduct necessary to make out a violation and would have 
done so to such an extent that . .. the legitimate zeal of attorneys 
representing their clients would have been chilled. "28 In other words, 
the amendment to section 1927 changed the extent of liability of an 
attorney found in violation. Query, however, whether in light of the 
policy judgments made by Congress, that is all it did,29 a question to 
which I shall return. In any event, the amended statute by itself 
hardly provides authority for the expansive approach to sanctions 
taken in the proposed amendments. 
What of the "court's inherent power "? Here, we immediately 
encounter a problem of definition that has eluded or bedeviled many 
courts and commentators for years.30 The Advisory Committee may 
27. S. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1979), 125 CoNG. REC. 19,916 (1979). See also 
S. REP. No. 238, 96th Cong., l st Sess. 2-3, 9- l 0 (1979). 
28. 126 CoNG. REc. H8048 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 1980). See also H.R. REP. No. 1234, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (Conference Repart), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 2781, 2782 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
29. [W]e chose not to alter the standard of conduct required by present law. What 
we did change was the extent of liability to be imposed on attorneys who engage in 
clearly dilatory tactics . . . .  The extent of this liability cannot, in justice, be limited 
merely to filing fees and other nominal court costs as it is today. But it should 
extend to out-of-pocket costs that the opposition had to incur for legal fees and 
witness expenses because of the attorney's misconduct. This is what our compromise 
does-this is all it does, and I believe that it should be accepted by this body. 
I 26 CONG. REc. H8048 (daily ed. Aug. 28, I 980) (statement of Rep. McClory). 
30. For assistance in penetrating the rhetoric of inherent judicial power, see Frankfurter 
& Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal 
Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010 (1924); Levin & Amster­
dam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem of Constitutional Revision, 
107 U. PA. L. REv. l, 29-33 ( 1958); Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court 
Af ecting Procedure, 22 WASH. U.L.Q . 459 (1937). See also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1021 
n.l9. 1115 n.455. 1183 n.728. 
Apart from failing to distinguish between judicial power to act in the absence of contrary 
legislative direction and power to act notwithstanding such direction, the problem discussed in 
the text, commentators are too quick to find assertions of inherent power in judicial opinions. 
Take, for instance, Hecker v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) I 23 (1865) (The date of decision and 
the proper case caption can be found in 17 Law. Ed. 759. The error in the official report was 
confirmed by the Court's Reporter of Decisions on March 25, 1983.), where the Court stated: 
"Circuit courts, as well as all other federal courts, have authority to make and establish all 
necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such rules are 
not repugnant to the laws of the United States." !d. at 128 (emphasis added). The case is 
cited for the proposition that the federal courts possess inherent power to make rules. See, e.g., 
R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOO:-JEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE fED-
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be no exception, if the serial citation of Roadway Express and Half 
v. Co/e31 in the Note to proposed Rule 11 was intended to suggest 
that these cases stand for the same proposition. 32 In Hall, the Court 
was discussing an equitable doctrine that, as the opinion itself 
pointed out, is within the power of Congress to reverse. 33 In Road­
way Express, on the other hand, the Court was discussing a power 
that is inherent in the sense that it trumps a contrary determination 
by Congress. It is for that reason that the Court observed: "Because 
inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they 
must be exercised with restraint and discretion. "34 Indeed, appar­
ently preoccupied with the specific context (attorney's fees), the 
Court opined that "a specific finding as to whether counsel's conduct 
.. . constituted or was tantamount to bad faith . . .  would have to 
precede any sanction under the court's inherent powers. "311 
It may not be fair to tax the Advisory Committee with perpetu­
ating confusion about the concept of inherent power, both because its 
citation to Hall occurs in the Note to proposed Rule 1 1  and the 
specific reference to "the court's inherent power " occurs in the Note 
to proposed Rule 26, and because the Court itself was confused in 
Roadway Express, relying on cases such as Hall and Alyeska Pipe­
line Service v. Wilderness Society,36 cases involving judicial power 
indisputably subject to congressional override, 37 for the content of a 
judicial power "shielded from direct democratic controls. " Again, 
however, the inherent power concept, at least as blessed by the Su-
ERAL RULES OF CiVIL PROCEDURE 181 n.473 (1981); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 374, 396 n.80 ( 1982); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abwe 
the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 619, 633 (1977). Of course. even if the Court had 
been asserting inherent power, it was power subject to congressional override. But the Court 
was not asserting any inherent power at all. Rather, it was, in the italicized language, directly 
quoting the Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, I Stat. 73, 83. See also Burbank, supra note 2, 
at 1115 n.455. 
31. 412 U. S. I (1973). 
32. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
33. "This does not end our inquiry, however, for even where 'fee-shifting' would be ap­
propriate as a matter of equity, Congress has the power to circumscribe such relief. " 412 U.S. 
at 9. 
34. 447 U. S. at 764. 
35. !d. at 767 (emphasis added). Although this dictum may be defensible, its origins, see 
infra text accompanying notes 36-37, provide grounds for skepticism. One might have hoped 
for greater "restraint and discretion" in the articulation of the doctrine of inherent power. 
36. 421 u.s. 240 (1975). 
37. See supra text accompanying note 33; see also 421 U. S. at 259 ("These exceptions 
are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in partic-
ular situations, unless forbidden by Congress . ."). 
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preme Court in Roadway Express, hardly supports, by itself, the 
breadth of the sanction provisions in these proposed amendments. 
We are remitted then to the Advisory Committee's reliance on 
Rule 37 and can now better understand its citation, in the Note to 
proposed Rule 26, of a student piece in the University of Chicago 
Law Review, where the author concludes: "[T]he great advantage of 
sanctions entered pursuant to the courts' rulemaking power is that 
negligent or reckless conduct can clearly be sufficient for liability."38 
There is no question that provisions of Rule 37 in its present form 
authorize the imposition of sanctions, including attorney's fees, for 
conduct that does not rise to the level of bad faith and that is not as 
egregious as conduct triggering 28 U.S.C. § 1927.39 The inquiry then 
is whether such provisions are a ':'.�159 �-exercise of the rulemaking 
power, an inquiry that requires us to consider the Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934.40 
For purposes of simplicity, it may be useful to phrase two ques­
tions: (1) Does the Supreme Court have the power under the Rules 
Enabling Act to promulgate rules that authorize the imposition of 
sanctions, including reasonable attorney's fees, on parties or their at­
torneys for conduct that is negligent (or, if you like, non-willful, not 
in bad faith, or whatever similar formulation is necessary to remove 
the proposed amendments from any protective umbrella of section 
1927 and inherent power as defined in Roadway Express)? (2) Does 
the Supreme Court have the power under the Act to promulgate 
rules that require the imposition of sanctions in those circumstances ? 
I believe the answer to the first question is affirmative, although that 
answer is not reached without difficulty. An affirmative answer to the 
second question requires the surmounting of even greater difficulties. 
As long as Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.41 remains law and the 
Court that promulgates Federal Rules and amendments has the final 
word on their validity,42 disputations regarding validity and invalid-
38. N01e, supra note 30, at 636. For the Committee's citation, see supra text accompa­
nying note 13. The Note otherwise contains a number of impediments to citation, including the 
attribution to Congress of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. 
at 632 ("Congress not only added these two provisions .... "). See also supra note 30. 
39. See FED. R. C!v. P. 37(a)(4), (b), (c) & (d). See also FED. R. Crv. P. 30(g). But 
see FED. R. C!v. P. 37(g) (requiring failure "to participate in good faith"). 
40. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (1976)). 
41. 312 U. S. I (1941). Sibbach has not been repudiated. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 
1023. 
42. See W. BROWN, supra note 2, at 75-78; see also Burbank, supra note 2, at 1129 
n.515, 1134 n.530, 1137. There are suggestions that the Chief Justice, at least, is disposed to 
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ity are likely to be of purely academic interest, and the remedy, if 
any, to overreaching will come by way of congressional action. As 
one who has recently penned many pages of academic disputation on 
the subject,43 I will hardly shirk an opportunity for a brief refrain 
particularly because, for reasons not unrelated to those germane in a 
doctrinal analysis, there is some basis for prediction that Congress, 
given its willingness since 1973 to intercept proposed Federal Rules 
and amendments,44 will show an interest in these. 
Historical research suggests that Congress' purpose in the 
famous first two sentences of the 1934 Act4� was to allocate lawmak­
ing power between federal institutions, the Supreme Court (as 
rulemaker) and Congress, and that the protection of state law was 
deemed a likely effect, rather than the primary purpose, of the pro­
cedure/substance dichotomy. 46 Moreover, the history tells us that 
Congress intended significantly greater limitations on rulemaking 
than the Court has acknowledged-either implicitly in promulgating 
Federal Rules and amendments or explicitly in cases adjudicating 
their validity. Briefly, Congress' concerns seem to have been 
rulemaking in areas where choices would have a predictable and 
identifiable impact on rights claimed under the substantive law or on 
interests claimed under the Constitution, and rulemaking in areas 
where choices would create rights substantially similar to rights 
under the substantive law in their effect on persons or property.47 
Of course, a sanction-the sanction of arrest for contempt in 
failing to obey an order to submit to a physical examination-was 
central to the Court's decision, although not to the parties' argu­
ments, in the Sibbach case.48 Moreover, in the pre-1934 legislative 
materials that inform the interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act, 
there is evidence of particular concern about arrest, probably be-
disengage the Court from rule promulgation. See id. at ! 021 n.l6, 1195-96. The principles 
approved by the ADA's House of Dckgatcs in 1982 call for transfer of the Court's functions to 
the Judicial Conference. See supra note 2. 
43. Burbank, supra note 2. 
44. See id. at 1018-20. 
45. "[T]he Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by 
general rules . . . the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and 
procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the 
substantive rights of any litigant." Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § l, 48 Stat. 
1064, 1064. For the subsequent history of the Act, see Burbank, supra note 2, at 1101-04. 
84. 
46. See Burbank, supra note 2, at 1106-12. 
47. See id. at 1121-31. 
48. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. I, 14, 16 (1941); Burbank, supra note 2, at 1181-
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cause of its equivalence in the bill's sponsors' minds with a rule
_ 
of 
substantive law.49 In any event, the Court's convoluted reasonmg 
about Rule 37 in Sibbach aside, �0 that rule is valid even with respect 
to the sanction of arrest for contempt precisely because it makes no 
choices.�1 
We need not be concerned about the sanction of arrest (for con­
tempt) in connection with the proposed amendments to Rules 11 and 
26, because the trial judge retains discretion to choose from a range 
of available sanctions.62 What then is the problem? As I see it, the 
problem is this: In the legislative history of the amendments to 28 
U .S.C. § 1927, Congress itself identified as a concern the effect of 
alternative choices among standards for imposing sanctions on the 
"legitimate zeal " of attorneys in representing their clients.1 3 In other 
words, it was not the sanction to be imposed-Congress agreed that 
the range of sanctions should be augmented-but the conduct trig­
gering the imposition that was of concern. Moreover, Congress ap­
parently believed that judgments about the effect of alternative sanc­
tioning standards on lawyers' conduct (and, implicitly, on their 
clients' cases) could be made with some confidence. 
Even with the gloss provided by this legislative history, I do not 
maintain that the proposed amendments are invalid under the stan­
dards emerging from the Rules Enabling Act's pre-1934 history. For 
accepting, as I do not, Congress' judgment about the predictability 
of impact of choices among different sanctioning standards, that im­
pact is not identifiable in any particular class of cases. 64 The 
rulemakers have not, however, aided their case by supplementing one 
rulemaking choice with another, that is, by making the imposition of 
sanctions mandatory upon a finding of violation. 
The proposed amendments to Rules 11 and 26 differ from the 
49. See Burbank, supra note 2, at I 121-22, I 124, I 128. 
50. See id. at I 181-82. 
51. See id. at I I 84. More generally, "[t]o the extent that a Fed .:raJ Rule makes no 
choices or makes a choice the consequences of which are defeasible by operation of another 
Federal Rule, the argument for invalidity under [the standards derived from the Act's pre-
1934 history] appears to be weakened considerably." Jd. at I 193 (footnote omitted). 
Of course, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) does not permit the trial court to treat failure to obey an 
order to submit to a physical or mental examination as a contempt of court. The counterpart 
involved in Sibbach, see 312 U. S. at 9, authorized, excepl in such cases, "an order directing 
the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders . ." See 
Burbank, supra note 2, at 1181 n.718. 
52. See supra notes 9, I I. 
53. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
54. Cf Burbank, supra note 2, at I 129-30 (evidence), 1183 (discovery). 
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provisions of Rule 37 in at least one significant respect: The proposed 
amendments require the court to impose sanctions upon violation of 
the respective certification requirements, whereas Rule 37 affords 
discretion, even though at first blush there does not appear to be 
any. � �  In this aspect, the proposed amendments do not, and do not 
purport to, find any support in Rule 37 or in the other sources of 
authority relied on: (1) An inflexible requirement to impose sanc­
tions is the antithesis of the equitable doctrine referred to in the Ad­
visory Committee Note to proposed Rule 11. "The essence of the 
equity jurisdiction," the Court has reminded us, "has been the power 
of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the ne­
cessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has 
distinguished it." �6 (2) A rule affording no discretion cannot, I be­
lieve, be justified as an exercise of "inherent power" of the sort to 
which the Court was referring in Roadway Express. Such a rule 
hardly bespeaks the "restraint and discretion" to which the Court in 
that case referred. �7 (3) Finally, in this aspect, section 1927 clearly 
contemplates the exercise of discretion by the trial judgc.�8 
The Advisory Committee's ambivalence on this score is obvious 
in the Notes, which, in speaking of "explicitly encouraging the impo­
sition of sanctions,"�9 seem to me to toll the thirteenth hour. And, 
again, I recognize that discretion is preserved as to the sanction that 
will be imposed (as well as, inevitably, in the application of the stan­
dard to any given set of facts). But a lawyer concerned about adher­
ing to the Code of Professional Responsibility and to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is unlikely to assume that, after so much 
effort, the rulemakers have created a paper tiger. Moreover, my ho­
pothetical lawyer cannot take much comfort from the picture of due 
process in sanctioning painted by the Advisory Committee,60 which, 
55. Thus, putatively mandatory language in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), (b) & (d) is 
qualified by the identical clause, "unless the court finds that the [relevant behavior] was sub­
stantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. " See also 
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c). Imposition of sanctions under FED. R. C!v. P. 37(g) is explicitly discre­
tionary ("the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require . . . .  "). But see FED. R. CJv. 
P. 56(g). 
56. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
57. Supra text accompanying note 34. 
58. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 8. 
59. Proposed FED. R. Clv. P. 26 advisory committee note, SUPREME COURT REPORT, 
supra note l ,  at 58. 
60. See proposed FED. R. C!v. P. II advisory committee note: 
The procedure obviously must comport with due process requirements. The particu­
lar format to be followed should depend on the circumstances of the situation and 
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although consistent with the austere landscape of Link v. Wabash 
Railroad,61 does not seem of one piece with the Court's more recent 
expression on the subject in Roadway Express,62 or with Congress' 
purpose in amending section 1927. We have apparently returned to 
the view that " [t] o  say that a law does not violate the due process 
clause, is to say the least possible good about it."6 3 That is hardly 
the view the House and Senate managers took when, as reported by 
one of them, they 
strongly agreed that judges who util ize section 1 927 sanctions must 
make every effort to safeguard the rights of an attorney who may 
be held in violation of that section. In so doing, it is imperative that 
the court afford the attorney all appropriate protections of due 
process available under the law.64 
We are not, in any event, confined to the evidence of history in 
interpreting the Rules Enabling Act. The standards of rulemaking 
the severity of the sanction under consideration. In many si tuations the judge's par­
ticipation in the proceedings provides him with full knowledge of the relevant  facts 
and little further inquiry will be necessary. 
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the 
pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposi­
tion of sanctions, the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction 
proceedings to the record. Thus, discovery should be conducted only by leave of the 
court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances. 
SUPREME COURT R E PORT, supra note ! ,  at 4 1 .  See also proposed FED. R. Ci v .  P. 26(g) advi­
sory committee note: 
The sanctioning process must comport with due process requirements. The kind 
of notice and hearing required will depend on the facts of the case and the severity 
of the sanction being considered. To prevent the proliferaton of the sanction proce­
dure and to avoid multiple hearings, discovery in any sanction proceeding normally 
should be permitted only when it is clearly required by the interests of justice. I n  
most cases the court will b e  aware o f  the circumstances and only a brief hearing 
should be necessary. 
SUPREME COURT REPORT, supra note I ,  at 60. Thus does fairness yield to the demands, as 
well as the jargon, of efficiency, convincing even one who is skeptical about the accuracy of the 
picture drawn by Resnik, supra note 30, that the author has a point. This is "managerial 
judging" with a vengeance. Note, moreover, that as recently as ! 980, the rulcmakers saw fit to 
provide in the text of FED. R. CJv. P. 37(g) that a sanction might be imposed "after opportu­
nity for hearing." 
6 1 .  370 U. S. 626, 632 ( 1 962). 
62. "Like other sanctions, attorney's fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or 
without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record." 447 U .S .  at 767 (footnote 
omitted ) .  
63.  Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 25  ARK.  L. 
REV. 9, 25 ( 1 97 1 ) . 
64. 1 26 CONG. R Ec. H8047 (daily ed . Aug. 28, 1 980) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli). See 
a/so COI'FERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 8. 
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allocation suggested by the pre- 1934 history were formulated for an­
other age and may not be adequate for the needs of the nation to­
day.65 Whereas much of the debate about these sanctioning provi­
sions has concerned-and the Advisory Committee appears to have 
painted a picture of due process with an eye to--the possible effect 
of "satellite litigation " on judicial administration,66 a procedural 
concern, the concern identified by Congress in the legislative history 
of the amendment of section 1 927 is much more difficult to charac­
terize. Consider the brouhaha about the privilege provisions in the 
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.6 7 
The Rules Enabling Act allocates lawmaking power. Where our 
elected representatives have concluded that choices among standards 
for imposing sanctions on attorneys implicate the effectiveness of 
representation of clients, it seems to me a fair question whether 
those choices should be made by the rulemakers or by Congress.68 
The question is more insistent when the trial judge's discretion is, 
even if only formally, constrained. It should be obvious that I do not 
regard the "laying before " provision of the Rules Enabling Act69 as 
a substitute for, or as equivalent to, congressional action. 7 0  In light 
of Congress' unhappiness with that mechanism in recent years, 71 and 
of the concerns expressed in connection with section 1 927, the point 
may again become a moot one. If so, the blame lies with all of us for 
continuing to fail to confront "the admittedly difficult business of 
defining institutional limits in a federal democracy. " 72 
65. See Burbank. supra note 2, at 1 1 04·06, 1 1 86-97. 
66. See supra note 60. 
67. See, e.g., S. REP.  No. 1 277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 ( 1 974); 1 20 CONG . REC. 1 420-
21 ( 1 97 4) (statement of Rep. Holtzman);  id. at 239 i -92. 
68. Compare proposed FED. R .  Ctv. P. 1 1  advisory committee note, SuPREME CoURT 
R E PORT, supra note 1, at 39 ("The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or 
creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.") with supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
The point, of course, is not that Congress' conclusion abcut the effect of sanctions on the 
"legitimate zeal" of attorneys is correct or, indeed, that against the background of the pro­
posed amendments, the concern should dominate in the lawmaking calculus. It is rather that 
articulated public policy should not be ignored by the rulemakers. 
69. "Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the 
Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first 
day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported." 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 ( 1 976). 
70. See Burbank, supra note 2, at II 02, 1 1 96. 
7 1 .  See id. at 1 0 1 8-20, 1 1 96 n.779. 
72. /d. at 1 1 97. 
